Independent Australian Jewish Voices

In 1986, Anton Shammas' Hebrew-language novel Arabesques was published in Israel. When the novel was translated and published in English two years later it was chosen by the editors of The New York Times Book Review as one of the best seven fiction works of 1988. This is of course not usual: Yaakov Shabtai's 1977 novel Past Continuous, for example, hailed as a masterpiece within Israel, was published in English in 1985 and subsequently named the greatest novel of the 1980's by The Independent literary critic Gabriel Josipovici, who compared Past Continuous to Proust's In Search of Lost Time. What is unusual, indeed unprecedented, is that Arabesques was written originally in Hebrew by an Israeli Arab who grew up in the village of Fassuta, a small village in northern Israel that consists mostly of Christian Arabs. The publication of the novel caused a whirlpool of controversy and interest within Israel, and the fact that the book was a popular best seller (in comparative terms the book sold as many copies as Stephen King was selling at the time) only served to fan the flames further. Shammas's novel is the work of a writer with an impeccable command of the Hebrew language, "delicately interlacing biblical allusions and appropriations from early European Hebrew writings with all of Israel's youngish ''spoken'' Hebrews". The novel did not come out of the blue, before it was published Shammas was an "active contributor to Israeli newspapers and periodicals", published a book of poetry and a children's book, and several translations from Arabic into Hebrew.

As a New York Times reviewer noted at the time, some Israelis were incensed that the author of Arabesques was an Israeli Arab. "What is an Arab doing writing in our language, the language of our religion and of our experience (and, yes, of the nation)? If Hebrew means Jewish - and for thousands of years it has - what now? What does this mean for our literature? Our culture? Our state?" Others had a contrasting but equally emotional response. Amos Oz, the accomplished Israeli writer and intellectual, said at the time when asked whether he thinks the fact that a successful novel has been written by an Israeli Arab is a turning point in Israeli society: "I think of this as a triumph, not necessarily for Israeli society, but for the Hebrew language. If the Hebrew language is becoming attractive enough for a non-Jewish Israeli to write in it, then we have arrived."

Some saw the novel as a protest of sorts, and Shammas's ruminations regarding his novel seem to fit that characterisation. "What I had in mind with Arabesques, what I call it, is my identity card,'' Shammas said in 1988. ''In Israel, on your actual identity card, there is a space for nationality, and in this space you are 'Arab' or 'Jew.' Now with my novel I was trying to prove -to myself, in writing it, as much as to anyone who might read it - that there is something which I think of as Israeli, which is not a matter of Arab or Jew, but a matter of living in a place called Israel.''

Compared to the late 1980's, the impact of the Hebrew language upon the Israeli Arabs has only become stronger and more widespread. This is not surprising: as new generations grow up in the midst of an Israeli culture where Hebrew is the dominant language it is to be expected that they would  (whether consciously or unconsciously, whether by will or by force) adopt Hebrew to varying extents. Hebrew and Arabic are both the official languages in Israel, though there have been recent attempts by Knesset members from the Likud and Kadima parties to make Hebrew the sole primary language of Israel, with Arabic, Russian, and English becoming secondary languages. Israeli Arabs cannot function without at least a rudimentary knowledge of Hebrew. Israel's universities teach in Hebrew (or English), for example, and so Israeli Arab students must of course gain a high level of competency in Hebrew; and official documents (such as for tax or accounting purposes) are in Hebrew and thus many shopkeepers in Israeli Arab towns and cities tend to keep their records in Hebrew. "The receipt books are in Hebrew," said a shopkeeper recently, "so that we can show them to the tax authorities or the accountants, and as a result, we are forgetting our Arabic." The Hebrew words that have entered the Israeli Arab lexicon roughly fall into two sorts: everyday expressions (that might appear in spoken language or on street signs, etc.), and words that Arabs associate with Israeli culture. Everyday expressions include such words as b’seder (all right, okay), b’vakasha (please) and me’anyen (interesting), whereas the latter category includes such words as ramzor (traffic light), machsom (checkpoint), g’lidah (ice cream), lachmaniyah (bakery roll) and sulamit (the hash sign on telephone dials).

Such a linguistic phenomenon is far from unique and occurs in many situations where two or more languages intersect. The difference here, however, is the political overtones of such a growing phenomenon. An Israeli social linguist remarks that "Israel's Arabs are developing their own independent identity, different from that of the Palestinians in the territories and other Arabs." Such a conclusion appears unavoidable, especially in light of the several generations in which the Palestinians outside Israel have been seaprated from the Palestinians inside Israel (the Israeli Arabs). This conclusion has enraged many Arabs outside Israel who point to the continuity and solidarity that the Palestinians outside of Israel have in regard to the Palestinians inside of Israel. Such a continuity is seen as essential in the struggle to free the region of the injustices that burden and afflict the Palestinian people. But the divide is evident (though perhaps is will reach an asymptote acceptable to both sides). The social linguist Muhammad Amara notes that Hebrew as used by the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories "is totally different, and is related to military terms. The most-used word is, of course, machsom [roadblock], as the roadblocks have taken over life there.” The use of Hebrew by the Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, can be seen in terms of an emerging and somewhat separate identity. Amara continues in regard to the Israeli Arabs: “Undoubtedly, it indicates that, although this society is Arabic and Palestinian, there’s something that distinguishes it from other Palestinian groups — whether in the territories or in the [Palestinian] diaspora — and it’s the fact that they’re in contact with the Jewish society and are influenced by it.”

The increasing use of Hebrew by Israeli Arabs is frowned upon by Arabs outside of Israel because they see it as an erosion of the Arabic culture and language. Amara notes that this process ("that is shaking the Arabs to their very foundations") is a functional one: "Arabs cannot afford not to develop a broad association with Jewish society unless they want to cut themselves off completely, and I don't think they want that. They need Hebrew from the moment the step out of their homes, but this is not an Israelization of their Palestinian-Arab identity. They share none of the sentiments in Israel's Jewish symbols, and feel no connection to them." Indeed, as Amara rightly points out, a peaceful resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict will mean that such a process will most probably be reciprocated, with Israelis adopting Arabic and both languages would thus perhaps work in symbiosis and help to create a new identity that, as Anton Shammas said, is a matter of being Israeli and "not a matter of Arab or Jew, but a matter of living in a place called Israel.''

As a closing note, let us observe that such a symbiosis is indeed occurring: as Amara notes and as I know from personal experience, "Even today every Jew knows hundreds of words in Arabic, without even realizing it."

In an Opinion piece in the Sydney Morning Herald late last month, Colin Rubinstein, the executive director of AIJAC (Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council), commented that:

"While it is understandable that Palestinians remember the suffering of 700,000 Palestinians who fled or otherwise lost their homes in 1948, it is worth remembering that this tragedy was completely avoidable had Palestinians and the Arab states heeded the UN's resolution calling for two states for two peoples. Instead, a war to ethnically cleanse the area of Jewish inhabitants was launched."

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the UN passed resolution 181 in favour of the partition of Palestine. By a vote of 33-13 with 10 abstentions (the United Kingdom abstained) the resolution called for the creation of separate "Independent Arab and Jewish States and [a] Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem". It was to be a "plan of partition with economic union", which was to come into effect as soon as the British Mandate for Palestine ended. The plan was not perfect by any standards. As a number of scholars have noted, the long and winding borders separating the Arab from the Jewish state would have been a strategic nightmare; and the Jewish state was to house approximately 500,000 Jews as well as 400,000 Arabs (the Arab state would have housed approximately 725,000 Arabs but only 10,000 Jews), not an ideal situation for either side.

Before considering the reasons for the Arab rejection of the partition plan, let us take a look at the Jewish response, which was not entirely upbeat and was not subject to universal joy and dancing in the streets, though the majority were happy with the result. Menachem Begin, then commander of the Zionist group the Irgun and later the first Likud Prime Minister of Israel, was incensed. "The partition of Palestine is illegal," he said a day after the UN vote. "It will never be recognised... Jerusalem was and will for ever be our capital. All of it. And for ever." (see Begin's 1951 book The Revolt: Story of the Irgun). David Ben-Gurion, who would become the first Prime Minister of Israel, when asked at the time by the UN Special Committee on Palestine whether he would accept partition said: ""To partition," according to the Oxford dictionary, means to divide a thing into two parts. Palestine is divided into three parts, and only in a small part are the Jews allowed to live. We are against that. ... [T]his is our country, including the Arabs who are in it. This country is the country of the Jewish people and of all the other inhabitants."

A representative from Guatemala asked Ben-Gurion at the same sitting: "Several times I have heard about the possibility of violence if a decision of the United Nations were not accepted by a certain party. Suppose that decision would give absolute freedom to a Jewish State, would the Jewish people be able to resist violence and defend themselves?" Ben-Gurion's answer is very revealing in light of the discussion of the reasons the Arabs rejected the UN partition plan.

"You mean violence on the part of the Arabs?" Ben-Gurion answered. "The first thing we will do if such decision is given will be to make the greatest effort to come to an agreement with the Arabs. First, we will go to them and tell them, here is a decision in our favour. We are right. We want to sit down with you and settle the question amicably. If your answer is no, then we will use force against you. Then we will take care of ourselves."

This is an interesting remark. On the surface it appears benign. Ben-Gurion wanted to talk to the Arabs and attempt to come to an agreement. But "talk" is too strong a word. Ben-Gurion's stance is that "We are right": if the Arab population agrees with that stance, then there will be no violence. If the Arab population does not agree with the decision, then there will be violence.

The Jewish Agency of course officially accepted the partition plan, but even then they had their misgivings. A representative of the Jewish Agency said at the time that

According to David Lloyd George, then British Prime Minister, the Balfour Declaration implied that the whole of Palestine, including Transjordan, should ultimately become a Jewish state. Transjordan had, nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had subsequently been set up as an Arab kingdom. Now a second Arab state was to be carved out of the remainder of Palestine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would represent less than one eighth of the territory originally set aside for it. Such a sacrifice should not be asked of the Jewish people.

In other words, all of the land of Palestine and what is now Jordan was promised to the Jewish people by the British. Then in 1922, when Transjordan was created, the Jewish state became much smaller. So this further 1947 partition was not wholly embraced by the Jewish Agency either, even though they supported it publicly and (this cannot be underestimated nor ignored) it was indeed a major breakthrough for the Zionist movement, who arguably for the first time had international support for a Jewish state in Palestine.

Now what about the other side, the Arab population? Is it plausible that, as Rubinstein claims, "this tragedy was completely avoidable had Palestinians and the Arab states heeded the UN's resolution calling for two states for two peoples"? What were the reasoning of the Palestinians for rejecting the partition plan? The International Court of Justice has noted that "The Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States rejected this plan, contending that it was unbalanced..." The Arab League complained at the the time that the "Palestine Arabs['] natural rights are self evident and cannot continue to be subject to investigation but deserve to be recognized on the basis of principles of [the] United Nations Charter". The Arab League asserted that "the destiny of Palestine cannot be decided by outsiders... The people of Palestine shall decide the destiny of Palestine ..." And, in contradistinction to the Zionist claims, the Arab League stated that "Zionism has no rightful claim on Palestine. In the implementation of their programme, they have exclusively relied on the support of a foreign power régime conducting itself arbitrarily and unjustly. Their forces have been forces of repression."

The Palestinian population at the time did not feel it was just to partition what they felt was theirs, especially if the partition was imposed by an outside force. They worried about the consequence of the fact that, as a UN document stated at the time, "The Jews will have the more economically developed part of the country embracing practically the whole of the citrus-producing area which includes a large number of Arab producers" and that "the Arab State will not be in a position to undertake considerable development expenditure".

Thus, as the brief sketch above shows, the Palestinians at the time were not mad for refusing to accept the partition plan. They had legitimate and understandable grievances that were practically ignored. Both sides were ready to resort to violence to settle the matter, and thus their contradictory claims to the land resulted in two wars following the UN partition resolution (as Benny Morris' book 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War explains): first, "was the immediate Palestinian uprising against the Yishuv [the pre-State Jewish community], and then, after the Palestinian defeat, the coordinated invasion by the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan." It is thus misleading to suggest, as Rubinstein does, that "this tragedy was completely avoidable had Palestinians and the Arab states heeded the UN's resolution calling for two states for two peoples."

I will leave Rubinstein's other claim, that "Instead, a war to ethnically cleanse the area of Jewish inhabitants was launched", to another discussion. Suffice it to say for the moment that each side has explained its own atrocities by claiming that they were indirect consequences of the war, and that exceptions to this explanation are held by each side to be due to rogue soldiers acting without or in defiance of orders.

In late April of this year an exhibition opened of photographs of Arab refugees who were displaced from their homes in Israel in 1948. Held at London's Barbican Arts Centre, it consists of 16 black and white images taken by the photojournalist Alan Gignoux soon after Israel gained independence. However, even such an event, which I take to be relatively benign, has drawn the ire of London's Jewish community. England's Zionist Federation complained about the captions that were attached to the photographs in the exhibition, especially the fact that the captions stated that the Palestinians were "uprooted" and "dispossessed". The Israeli embassy also complained, by stating that the language used in the exhibition did not reflect reality. This may seem like mere pedantry (surely most people can agree that the Palestinians were "uprooted" and "dispossessed" without agreeing as to who or what caused the dispossession), but on closer inspection it is a symptom of a malaise (not unique to the Jewish community of course, but lets stick to them for the moment) that any view, however benign, that is contrary to one's own view must be "incomplete", "misleading", "unbalanced", "born out of a culture of bias", "out of context", or "exaggerated". All but one of these accusations are very easy to settle: by comparing the coverage of the media in regard to what and how they publish and not publish (this is important, you cannot judge whether the media is biased or not, for example, by only looking at what is in the media; you can only judge bias, etc., by looking at what is not in the media), and the merits of each accusation can thus be judged.

The accusation to which it is almost impossible to reply or redress, in my opinion, is that of "lack of balance". The spokesperson for the Israeli embassy in England insisted that the Barbican Arts Centre "balance its activities". Now, this may seem like a silly and naive question, but what does it mean for an organisation to "balance its activities"? The Barbican is holding London's Palestinian Film Festival this year, which is the biggest event of its kind in Europe. There have been Israeli film festivals in London in the past, just not at the Barbican (though there is a Yiddish film festival planned for next year), nevertheless, a member of the Zionist Federation is irritated that "If the Barbican thinks a Yiddish film season in 2009 goes any way towards balancing four successive years of Palestinian film festivals, they are wrong. It is about as much balance as would be putting chicken soup and salt beef on their restaurant menu." This strange, incessant and somewhat ridiculous call for universal "balance" is very common. For example, CAMERA (Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America) is "a media-monitoring, research and membership organization devoted to promoting accurate and balanced coverage of Israel and the Middle East"; Honest Reporting, which states that "Israel is in the midst of a battle for public opinion – waged primarily via the media", sees its task to be "To ensure Israel is represented fairly and accurately", it "monitors the media, exposes cases of bias, promotes balance, and effects change through education and action"; AIJAC (Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council) complains about the SBS Codes of Practice by saying that "there is no requirement for balance or accuracy in documentaries, there is no requirement that reports include sufficient relevant facts to give a proper understanding of the issues, only errors of fact regarded by SBS as 'significant' need be corrected...". (Apart from these, and other, pro-Israeli media watchdog groups, there are a number of pro-Palestinian media watchdog groups such as Arab Media Watch or Palestine Media Watch; click here for an extensive list of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian groups.)

I am well aware that the call for balance is out of suspicion (at times justified, at times not) that Israel is being "demonised", that a "double standard" is applied to Israel, that the circumstances in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are somehow unique and thus must be treated on their own terms, etc. But these suspicions are subject to the facts. If an organisation states that Israel is being demonised by a certain television station or journalist or politician or whoever, first you have to show that that is the case. Assuming that you have proved your case (and there have been cases where this has occurred), don't stop there, you have to ask why that television station (etc.) appears to be demonising Israel. Could it be something Israel did? When a crime is committed (whether it be a journalist or politician falsifying evidence, or an army commander targeting civilians), one of the first things that the relevant authorities (the police, the International Criminal Court , etc.) look for is a motive. Why did they commit the crime? And the same tactic should be used in regard to the accusations of "demonisation" etc. that are shown to be justified. Why would someone want to demonise Israel? Could it be something that Israeli did?

Calling for balance is superfluous and ridiculous if all it means is that the side of the one who calls for balance should also be heard. One must take an opinion contrary to one's own seriously, debate its merits and question its motives and evidence. Doing otherwise is unhelpful and arrogant to say the least. As John Stuart Mill said in the mid 19th century in his book On Liberty: "If the [opposing] opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."

 A 118-page report, titled BREAKING THE SILENCE: Soldiers’ Testimonies From Hebron 2005-2007, was published recently. The organisation (Breaking the Silence) is composed of "veterans who served in the Israeli army during the Second Intifada (since September 2000), and have taken upon themselves to expose the Israeli public to everyday life in the Occupied Territories, a routine situation that is never reflected in the media." What began as an exhibition of photographs taken by soldiers who served in the Occupied Territories in 2004 (the exhibition made it to Europe and the US) Breaking the Silence documents, in the soldiers' own words, how "young soldiers face a civilian population on an everyday basis and control its life." Only testimonies that have been corroborated (e.g., "cross-checking facts with additional eye-witnesses and/or archives of other human rights organizations who are also active in the field") are published. This latest report is based on the testimonies of over thirty enlisted men ("officers, commanders and soldiers") who served in Hebron from 2005 to 2007.

The city of Hebron, where approximately 800 Jewish settlers reside amongst 166,000 Palestinians, has and continues to be the epicentre of some of the most vile, indiscriminate and abhorrent behaviour displayed by the Jewish settlers towards not only their Palestinian neighbours, but also towards Israeli police, the Israeli army, and many visitors and activists. Hebron is where the Tomb of the Patriarchs is located, a sacred site to both Jews and Muslims who believe that the Biblical Fathers were buried there. It is the second largest Palestinian city in the West Bank "and the only one that harbours a Jewish settlement in its midst". The problem is not the Jewish presence per se, it is the behaviour of the settlers and the consequences of such behaviour on the policies of the Israeli government and the Israeli military in regard to Hebron. For example, in the late 1990's the city was separated into a Jewish and a Palestinian part (see the map below; taken from the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs). This resulted in a "legal and physical segregation between the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian majority" that led to "the economic collapse of the center of Hebron and drove many Palestinians out of the area." (Although area H2 is controlled by Israel and area H1 is controlled by the Palestinians, the population numbers in both areas are predominantly Palestinian.) There exists "severe and extensive restrictions on Palestinian movement" in Hebron, and the soldiers, as the Breaking the Silence report makes clear, are either complicit or oblivious to the settlers' violent attacks (both physical and verbal) on the Palestinians (see for example, B'Tselem's Shooting Back project, where Palestinians living in high-conflict areas were given video cameras to record illegal activity by the Israeli army and Jewish settlers).

The Hebron violence and animosity is of course not wholly the domain of the Jewish settlers, but the Palestinian residents of Hebron do not have thousands of soldiers protecting them (perhaps the "ratio is 1 settler to 4 soldiers") and the Israeli government, at the very least, is heavily biased towards the Israeli settlers. Thus the actions of the Hebron Jewish settlers is more pertinent, and cowardly. It is cowardly because, as quickly becomes evident whilst reading the Break the Silence report, the adult settlers very rarely engage in actual "flagrant, physical violence": rather, "they send their kids to do it." They send their kids to "throw stones at the girls from Cordoba (a Palestinian girls’ school)", they send their kids to "pick up building blocks that look about 5 kilos each, and simply throw them at the cars [of the TIPH (Temporary International Presence at Hebron) activists], smashing glass", they send their kids to do these and other acts of vandalism and intimidation because the adults know that, as one soldier in the report put it: "Listen, you know that these are kids under the age of 14 so there’s nothing I can do.” Another soldier noted to himself that one day that "your mission is to protect Palestinian homes from little, vicious Jewish children. Period. That’s the mission there on Saturdays."

The report also highlights the soldiers' own behaviour, regardless of what the settlers do. Incidents of beatings ("Then the rest of the guys on patrol saw the beating. Everyone jumped on him… They beat him up, really beat him up… Hit him with sticks, in the head… And then one started choking him, with two hands. He [the Palestinian] was 17 or 18"), theft ("A little looting was normal. Backgammon and cigarettes, everything… Everything that looked nice we took. Other guys took presents for their girlfriends from stores") and vandalism ("Some of us kept clubs in our vests. It would get to the point where we’d be walking down the street, patrolling, suddenly stop a vehicle, just for the sake of it, stop it, check it out, break doors and such, not really gentle. Smash up the door from inside. Maybe they’re hiding weapons") are just a few deplorable examples.

It is difficult to put all the blame on the soldiers themselves, most of whom are straight out of high school with little notion of the bigger picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (when asked "what are the procedures you’re given, generally, regarding the settlers?", a solider in the report answered: "Nothing"); the bulk of the blame should lie with the authorities, with the Israeli government and the Israeli Defence Forces, for creating an environment that in a sense turns these young soldiers (many of whom believe that they are in the army to protect the State of Israel) into instruments of coercion. Such an environment is reminiscent of the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, in which American college students took part in a simulation of prison life. Part of the students were given the role of prison guards and rest of their fellow students were given the role of prison inmates. The experiment had to be ended prematurely after only six days because the the prison guards became horribly sadistic, doing things to their friends that they would never have imagined they could do to their own classmates.

The Stanford Prison Experiment sought to discover "What happens when you put good people in an evil place? Does humanity win over evil, or does evil triumph?" And there are certain parallels with the case of the soldiers in the Breaking the Silence report: the soldiers are put in a position of overwhelming power and dominance ("I can safely say that the power you wield there is incredible"), and if the students in the Stanford experiment were able to do such horrible things to their friends and peers, it does not take a vivid imagination to realise that the young Israeli soldiers in Hebron are likely to do horrible things to the Palestinian residents (whom most soldiers do not see as their peers nor as their friends). This by no means absolves the soldiers of responsibility for their disgusting acts, but in the broader context we can come to better understand the causes of the soldiers' behaviour and work towards rehabilitating and changing the overall political and military structure that puts them in those situations in the first place.

The verbal assault by certain Western leaders on Iran (apart from the political and economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran unilaterally by the US, or by the UN) has remained at such terrifying heights for so long that, for example, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's comments of a few days ago that the US will "totally obliterate" Iran if it attacks Israel has passed without widespread condemnation. "I want the Iranians to know that if I'm the president, we will attack Iran," Clinton said. "In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them." For its part, Iran has said in the past that were it to be attacked by the US, it will respond with an "even more decisive strike" that will "lead to America's collapse".

The enmity between the US and Iran is nothing new, it goes back to at least 1953, when, after nationalizing the oil industry, then Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence. Therefore comments such as the above should perhaps not be surprising given the history of the two countries, but what is alarming is that Western leaders have been impulsively comparing current Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a "modern Hitler". The most recent example that comes to mind is former Israeli Prime Minister (and current opposition leader) Benyamin Netanyahu, who recently stated, along with two other members of the Knesset, that the task of the United States "as the leader of the free world, is to act to remove the Iranian threat on world peace. Ahmadinejad is a modern Hitler and we cannot now repeat the mistakes that were made before the Second World War."

Let us put things in perspective: Ahmadinejad is not the modern Hitler; as president of Iran, he doesn't even have sole control of the army, and it is the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, who has the ultimate say in all major policy decisions of Iran, including declaring war. There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad has made some unwarranted, racist, and unhelpful statements (some provoked, some not), but that's true of all sides (the US, Israel, the EU, etc.). By comparing Ahmadinejad to Hitler, these Western leaders risk diluting the impact of a comparison between a modern day government or dictator and that of the Nazi Party and Hitler. We must of course be forever vigilant in order to prevent the rise of fascist dictators and the repetitions of past horrors such as the Nazi Holocaust, but we cannot allow the use of labels such as "the modern Hitler" to be used indiscriminately, for then they would lose all meaning and thus be reduced to clichés (like the label "the modern Einstein", that has been used so much that the label has lost its prestige).

And what of the threat to "the free world" that Iran poses? US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said it best late last year. She stated that the US was well within its rights to impose sanctions against Iran and that "We're taking additional actions to defend our interests and our citizens, and to help our friends to secure their countries". In other words, Rice states that the US is well within its rights to defend its (financial) interests by whatever means, and since "our friends" help the US to achieve their aims, the US will make sure their countries are secure (so that they can continue to help the US achieve their aims). If a country's interests happens to conflict with the interests of the US then that country is no longer "our friend", and the US is thus "well within its rights" to defend its interests by whatever means it sees fit.

I am not trying to deny that the stand-off between Israel and Iran, amongst others, is a dangerous predicament that could result in an all out war with many casualties; but the reasons for the conflict are much more complicated than "Ahmadinejad is a modern Hitler and therefore his aim is to wipe Israel off the map."